Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Monday, August 18, 2014

Iran may partially invade Iraq

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Iran may partially invade Iraq

posted at 3:21 pm on August 18, 2014 by Noah Rothman

As American forces continue to mount airstrikes on Islamic State positions around the key Mosul dam in support of Kurdish forces, it appears that Iran is prepared to increase its military support for Iraq’s Shia in the south and east.

An unconfirmed report in Iraqi News indicates that Iranian Revolutionary Guards forces are preparing to insert heavy armor into Iraq.

According to an informed source, tanks and armored vehicles belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are mobilizing to enter the Khanaqin district with the aim of the concentration in areas with Shiite majority north of the capital Baghdad and hit the insurgent of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

The source said that a convoy of tanks and armored vehicles moved through Serpil Zahab, a way to enter Iraq through the border crossing, which links between the two countries from Khanaqin district.

The source added that the Iranian forces will go to the areas which witnessed fighting between the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and militants of ISIL such as Jalawla, which had fallen to the insurgents recently. It is believed that the Iranians want to flush out the militants and deliver these areas to the Peshmerga fighters.

As if American negotiations with Iran over their nuclear program were not complicated enough by Washington’s reliance on an increasingly unhelpful and expansionist Russia to act as a mediator, American dependence on Tehran to serve as stabilizing force in Iraq is probably going to gum up the works in Vienna even further.

Reuters previously reported that, while Iran officially denies that its forces are engaging in combat operations inside Iraq, the recent deaths of Iranian fighters inside the neighboring country “shows that Iran has committed boots on the ground to defend Iraqi territory.”

“Regional experts believe the Revolutionary Guards have increased the supply of weapons and funds to proxy militant groups inside Iraq in recent weeks,” Reuters further reported.

American cooperation with Iran in Iraq is not merely limited to military operations. Last week, Iran withdrew its support for embattled former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and backed his chosen successor, Haider al-Abadi.

Abadi himself, long exiled in Britain, is seen as a far less polarising, sectarian figure than Maliki, who is also from the Shi’ite Islamic Dawa party. Abadi appears to have the blessing of Iraq’s powerful Shi’ite clergy, a major force since U.S. troops toppled Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003.

If and when the ISIS threat is diminished in Iraq, Iran will have established a foothold in Iraq which the West will find difficult to dislodge. When the fighting subsides, maybe Tehran will show they have learned from America’s mistakes and will negotiate a long-term status of forces agreement to ensure the gains they have made are not so easily lost.


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Thursday, August 14, 2014

Endgame: Maliki to step down, support Abadi as new prime minister of Iraq

Endgame:Malikitostepdown,supportAbadias

Endgame: Maliki to step down, support Abadi as new prime minister of Iraq

posted at 4:04 pm on August 14, 2014 by Allahpundit

America was tired of him, Iran was tired of him, the Sunnis were really tired of him, even the country’s Shiite-in-chief thought it was time for him to move along. There’s no doubt he would have dug in on last weekend’s attempted coup if he thought the military would protect him, but they were prepared to cut him loose as well.

And so an ignominious reign ends with a whimper.

It was Sistani’s letter a few days ago demanding a new prime minister that sunk him, apparently. Without a Shiite base of support, he had nothing.

Whether you think this is good news or bad news depends on whether you think Iraq can and should be preserved as a nation. With Abadi now in charge, the U.S. will be inclined to stick with the dream of a single multisectarian Iraq for awhile longer. Maybe Abadi can make nice with the Sunnis, which in turn would make things harder for ISIS in Anbar province. If the Sunni chieftains there now have a reason to reconcile with Baghdad, there might be a new Awakening in the offing. Good news! On the other hand, bad news: The more the U.S. clings to the “one Iraq” idea, the more it necessarily resists the idea of an independent Kurdistan. It could be that Abadi’s going to get a trial run from the White House to see how he does in making the Iraqi army less sectarian and in making sure the Kurds get their fair share of U.S. aid and arms. If he follows Maliki’s lead and tilts towards Shiite hegemony, Obama can pull the plug quickly and throw in with the Kurds. And then that’s the end of Iraq as far as America’s concerned.

Why did Iran end up pulling the plug on Maliki, though? Did they conclude, anticipating Sistani’s move, that he had lost so much support even among Shiites that he was no longer an effective proxy? Or were they worried that Iraq really was on the verge of breaking up, with Baghdad about to lose what little influence it still has over the Kurds and Kurdish oil assets?

Update: Some people on Twitter are celebrating the fact we finally, finally have a peaceful transition of power in a democratic Iraq, which will hopefully set a precedent for governments to come. I guess, but Maliki only took the civilized route when he had exhausted all other options and alienated pretty much the entire country. He left because he couldn’t find enough people in the military to keep him in power at gunpoint. He could have done this years ago — and had the opportunity — but fought bitterly to keep power, and now the country’s on the brink of breaking apart and being overrun by barbarians. Some victory.


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Tuesday, August 12, 2014

Iran, US endorse Maliki successor Haider al-Abadi

Iran,USendorseMalikisuccessorHaideral-Abadi

Iran, US endorse Maliki successor Haider al-Abadi

posted at 9:21 am on August 12, 2014 by Ed Morrissey

Iraq moved closer to ending its political crisis yesterday by finally selecting a new Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi. The decision by President Fuad Masum won approval from the US yesterday as Barack Obama didn’t even bother to mention his predecessor in a short statement from his vacation on Martha’s Vineyard. The wheels on the American bus weren’t the only ones that Nouri al-Maliki felt, either, as Iran endorsed Abadi as well:

Iraq’s new prime minister-designate won swift endorsements from both the United States and Iran on Tuesday as he called on political leaders to end crippling feuds that have let jihadists seize a third of the country.

Haider al-Abadi still faces a threat closer to home, where his Shi’ite party colleague Nuri al-Maliki has refused to step aside after eight years as premier that have alienated Iraq’s once dominant Sunni minority and irked Washington and Tehran. …

Underscoring the convergence of interest in Iraq that marks the normally hostile relationship between Washington and Iran, the head of Tehran’s National Security Council congratulated Abadi on his nomination. Like Western powers, Iran has been alarmed by the rise of Sunni militants across Syria and Iraq.

Abadi himself, long exiled in Britain, is seen as far less polarizing, sectarian figure than Maliki, who is also from the Shi’ite Islamic Dawa party. Abadi appears to have the blessing of Iraq’s powerful Shi’ite clergy.

That puts Maliki, currently holding out with his elite military in Baghdad, in a tight spot. Until now, Maliki appeared to have the backing of Iran and the majority of Shi’ites in Iraq, thanks to his distribution of the spoils of power and his friendliness with Tehran. Iran, though, sees ISIS as a major threat to their own position and have finally come to the conclusion that the only way to mitigate it is to have a viable Iraq as a buffer state, at least. That means working with Sunnis and Kurds, and Maliki clearly isn’t the man for that mission.

Speaking of the military in Baghdad, there are indications that Maliki may not enjoy their loyalty for much longer, either:

However, a senior government official said commanders of military forces that Maliki deployed around Baghdad on Monday had pledged loyalty to President Fouad Masoum and to respect the head of state’s decision to ask Abadi to form a new government.

The key for Abadi will be to allow the Sunnis and Kurds to once again occupy senior positions in the government and military. Maliki purged them from those positions over the last three years, which forced the Sunni tribal chiefs to throw in with ISIS and the Kurds to look for independence. It may be too late to keep the Kurds within a unitary state in Iraq, but the Sunni chiefs will soon tire of ISIS’ despotic and ghastly rule. Abadi will have a narrow window in which to get them back in the fold, but there should be a realistic chance of turning them once again.

The last time that happened, though, the US military was the guarantor of the alliance that defeated the then-AQI insurgency. There is no US military presence now to act as guarantor, so the Sunnis may have some …. trust issues with Baghdad, to say the least. And while the US is pledging cooperation with the Abadi government once the Cabinet positions have been filled, a new military presence is not on the table:

The United States will consider additional military, economic and political assistance to Iraq once a new inclusive government is formed, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said on Tuesday. …

“We are prepared to consider additional political, economic and security options as Iraq’s government starts to build a new government,” Kerry told a news conference together with Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and their Australian counterparts.

Hagel said the United States was prepared to consider further military support in Iraq. Kerry ruled out U.S. combat troops on the ground.

“We would wait and see what future requests this new government will ask of us and we will consider it based on those requests,” Hagel said.

The “no boots on the ground” strategy will only work if Abadi can unite the Iraqi army and raise its morale exponentially within a very short period of time. Part of that will depend on whether Maliki now leaves quietly (perhaps with some pressure from Iran?), or decides to play dog-in-the-manger and pull Baghdad down on top of all heads. Even if Maliki leaves with his blessing for Abadi, restoring the Iraqi military into an effective fighting force on its own against ISIS seems like sheer fantasy without Western intervention. If we aren’t going to fight ISIS on the ground, we’d better start giving the Kurds the means to do it now, and on a much larger scale than presently seen.


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Monday, July 14, 2014

Video: Jon Karl lists all the things going wrong with Obama’s foreign policy

Video:JonKarllistsallthethingsgoing

Video: Jon Karl lists all the things going wrong with Obama’s foreign policy

posted at 10:01 pm on July 14, 2014 by Mary Katharine Ham

Via the Free Beacon, forgive the length, but you understand there’s a lot to list.

The list is grave and important to hear all at once like that every now and then. Perhaps one of the PR strengths of this White House is to have so very many things going wrong at one time that one can forget about individual brush strokes of ineptitude as they blend into one magnificent mural of incompetence. Karl’s list doesn’t allow that so easily, and newly minted Press Secretary Josh Earnest must wrestle with it. His first tack— complain about media bias because a front-page story in the Wall Street Journal can’t possibly be an indicator of anything.

But the second tack is indicative of the White House’s problem. Granted, it is partially the press secretary’s job to say basically nothing, and given that Earnest’s longtime idol is the President, he is understandably a promising padawan of verbal piddling. But the level of nothingness herein, at the risk of mixing my science fiction/fantasy metaphors, is so great as to send Atreyu and Artax wading through the Swamp of Sadness.

Asked whether the president bears responsibility for these situations, and what he can do about it, Earnest dodged the questions and instead said that, in each situation, the president will consider “at the core the consequences it has for American national security.”

“In each of the situations you referenced,” Earnest continued. “People are asking a legitimate question about what is the proper role for the United States’ involvement,” curiously using the world’s confusion about Obama’s absence from action to pat the president on the back. I half expected him to end with, “and we are asking that question, too, and have no idea what the answer is.” Good news, though. The White House’s action item on the above list is to…consider a principle.


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Tuesday, July 8, 2014

Iran’s supreme leader calls for significant boost to uranium enrichment capacity

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Iran’s supreme leader calls for significant boost to uranium enrichment capacity

posted at 8:01 pm on July 8, 2014 by Noah Rothman

In December, President Barack Obama said he believed the odds that negotiation with Iran over the dismantling of their nuclear program would be successful were no better than 50-50. He got that half right.

With the P5+1 talks in Vienna over a potential nuclear accord with Iran resuming just last week, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei published his country’s latest demand on his official website.

“Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Iran would need to significantly increase its uranium enrichment capacity, highlighting a gap in positions between Tehran and world powers as they hold talks aimed at clinching a nuclear accord,” Reuters reported.

Khamenei called the prospect of shutting down one key underground enrichment facility “laughable.”

Iran insists it needs to expand its capacity to refine uranium to fuel a planned network of atomic energy plants. The powers say Tehran must sharply reduce that capacity to prevent the country being able to quickly produce a nuclear bomb using uranium enriched to a far higher degree.

Atomic negotiators seemed to suggest that the announcement comes as a surprise as Iranian officials had recently reduced their amount of uranium enrichment that they sought to secure in negotiations.

Director of the non-proliferation program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Mark Fitzpatrick told Reuters that this move confirms for him that Iranian nuclear negotiators are not free to accept terms limiting the Islamic Republic’s enrichment program.

Consenting to this latest demand is a non-starter for Western powers, and the July 20 deadline for the conclusion of talks is fast approaching.

Secretary of State John Kerry will reportedly travel to Vienna in the coming days where he will personally preside over the failure of the latest round of nuclear talks.


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Thursday, July 3, 2014

Joint Chiefs chair: The Iraqi army’s not going to be able to retake territory lost to ISIS by itself

JointChiefschair:TheIraqiarmy’snotgoing

Joint Chiefs chair: The Iraqi army’s not going to be able to retake territory lost to ISIS by itself

posted at 6:01 pm on July 3, 2014 by Allahpundit

No reason to doubt him. They’ve been fighting to retake Tikrit for more than a week with little progress.

This sounds like a job for — well, for Iran, actually.

“If you’re asking me, will the Iraqis at some point be able to go back on the offensive to recapture the part of Iraq that they’ve lost, I think that’s a really broad campaign quality question. Probably not by themselves,” Dempsey said. “Does it mean we would have to provide kinetic support? I’m not suggesting that that’s the direction this is headed. But, at any military campaign, you would want to develop multiple access to squeeze ISIL. You’d like to squeeze them from the south and west, you’d like to squeeze them the north, and you’d like to squeeze them from Baghdad. And that’s a campaign that has to be developed.”

“But the first step in developing that campaign is to determine whether we have a reliable Iraqi partner that is committed to growing their country into something that all Iraqis will be willing to participate in. If the answer to that is no, then the future is pretty bleak.”

Translation: If you want U.S. help, it’s time to transition from Maliki to a PM less despised by Sunnis and Kurds. Why would Iran agree to that, though? The consensus, which includes Dempsey himself, seems to be that Baghdad will hold. There are too many Shiites in the capital for ISIS to handle, especially when they’re spread thin trying to hold the Sunni areas they’ve already taken. The most ISIS can probably hope for in Baghdad is to seize some Sunni neighborhoods temporarily and to bleed the Shiites with a terror campaign. From Iran’s perspective, though, aren’t you better off with a Shiite rump state in Baghdad and the south that’s controlled by a proxy like Maliki than with a “unified” Iraq controlled by someone less loyal? The Kurds are probably gone for good anyway, so all you’d be getting in return for making a concession on the new prime minister is nominal unification between the Shiite and Sunni areas. Why not let the Sunnis go and trust that the U.S., the Saudis, Jordan, Turkey, and Kurdistan will keep the jihadis there in check? As long as the Saudis don’t threaten Iran by occupying Anbar province (which may be more likely today than it was yesterday), they can probably live with that area’s independence, no?

Note what Dempsey says too about squeezing ISIS from all directions — the west (Jordan), the south (Saudi Arabia), the north (Turkey and Kurdistan), and Baghdad (Iraqi Shiites and Iran). Hard to imagine those five actors cooperating on a battle plan, but maybe they don’t need formal cooperation. U.S. air assets could attack from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the peshmerga could push south, and the Shiites could push west. Maybe, in exchange for their help, the Kurds will gain support for formal independence from the other key actors. And once ISIS has been driven back into Syria, Iraq’s Sunni tribesmen can be bought off with Saudi money and promises of their own de facto independence to make sure ISIS has a harder time the next time it tries to come south. Exit question: You trust Iraq’s Shiites to let go of the oil fields in Sunni territory, don’t you?

Update: On second thought, letting Sunnistan go maybe isn’t such an easy call after all.


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Would Bush have been blamed if he hadn’t ousted Saddam?

WouldBushhavebeenblamedifhehadn’t

Would Bush have been blamed if he hadn’t ousted Saddam?

posted at 4:01 pm on July 3, 2014 by Allahpundit

Specifically, asks Robert Kaplan, would he have been blamed if the Arab Spring had erupted on schedule and a nervous Saddam (or the even nuttier Uday Hussein) brought down the hammer on Iraq’s Shiites? I asked a variation of that question myself recently.

The proper response, I guess, is “Blamed by whom?”

The Arab Spring was, as its name suggests, an exclusively Sunni Arab affair, whatever its pretensions to universalism. But Sunni or not, it spread its magic by way not only of social media and electronic communications, but by way of the Arabic language. For example, demonstrators in Yemen were inspired by demonstrators in Tunisia. And because Iraq’s Shiites are also Arabic speaking, it is likely that they, too, would have been inspired to revolt against a totalitarian and Sunni system that Bush, in this scenario, would have left in place.

A Shiite revolt against Saddam would have had one of two results: either Saddam would have crushed it with his trademark level of brutality that would have left tens of thousands dead; or, the revolt would have succeeded, with a sectarian war and the break-up of Iraq as a consequence. That, too, would have led to a scale of bloodshed comparable with the Syrian conflict. The idea that a soft landing was possible in Iraq following Saddam is probably naive. Fiercely secularizing Baathist regimes that use utter brutality to contain explosive ethnic and sectarian rivalries do not result in a soft landing.

Here is a paradox to consider: if George W. Bush had not invaded Iraq and the country violently blew apart in the course of the Arab Spring, Bush would have been blamed for not ridding Iraq of Saddam when he had had the chance. As someone who supported the Iraq War, this is a convenient paradox for me to entertain, even if I have to live with the facts as they exist, which declare the Iraq War a mistake.

Question one: Would the Arab Spring have happened at all if Saddam’s regime had been left intact? Hard to say, of course; who knows what sort of history-diverting regional shifts he might have caused between 2003 and 2010? Maybe he would have ended up brawling with Iran again, which would have drawn Iraqi Shiites back into Baghdad’s fold and maybe even drawn Syria in on Iran’s side. But yeah, quite possibly popular uprisings would have happened at some point. Political repression and economic stagnation have been constants for ages there, and when the pot did finally boil over, it happened in Tunisia and then Egypt, two African countries further removed from Saddam’s influence than his immediate neighbors. It’s possible that the Arab Spring would have developed without the war — which, ironically, a lot of Iraq war critics were quick to argue after the first dictator, Ben Ali, fell in Tunisia three years ago. “You can’t credit Bush for that!” they insisted. Fine by me. Let’s take the Arab Spring as a historical given, then.

Which brings us to question two: If Bush had left Baghdad alone, Ben Ali fell, and then Iraq exploded when the Shiites caught democracy fever, would Bush have been blamed for not having overthrown Saddam circa 2003? Principled hawks would have blamed him for sure. Principled doves and isolationists wouldn’t have. But what about the huge swath of middle-grounders, the partisans who may lean toward or against interventionism but not so far that they won’t instantly reverse positions to criticize a president from the other party? Specifically, what would the 2016 Democratic nominee-in-waiting — who does lean hawkish and who voted for invading Iraq when public support stood at over 60 percent — be saying these days about Bush’s culpability in not acting? Her own husband, as president, sure did seem to think Saddam was a threat. If Hussein had ended up killing thousands of restive Shiites and Kurds (which he’d done before, of course) in the name of suppressing an uprising, Hillary, Kerry, and the rest of the fickle Iraq hawks would have hammered him for shirking the world’s “responsibility to protect” and for dooming the region to a sectarian apocalypse. “Of course they would,” you might say. “That’s just politics.” But that’s my point. For many of Bush’s big-name critics, this is just politics.

In fact, even if Iraq had managed to avoid the maelstrom, with terrified Shiites too frightened to challenge Saddam despite being quietly egged on by Iran, Bush would have been blamed for that too. Look at the beating Obama took from hawks for not being bolder in supporting Iran’s Green Revolution in 2009. If Dubya had stood pat while Tunisia and then Egypt caught fire while Iraq’s Shiites wavered on whether to make a move on Saddam, he would have been pounded for not seizing a golden opportunity to aid domestic opponents in ridding the world of the Hussein boys once and for all. This is what baffles me about the people trying to blame the U.S. invasion for Iraq’s current clusterfark, which now involves the Shiite government rooting out Sunni “sleeper cells” inside Baghdad itself: Of all the arguments against the Iraq war that are available, the idea that it’s somehow irretrievably responsible for bringing thousand-year-old sectarian tensions to a head is one of the toughest. If you want to dump on Bush, stick with your best argument, that whatever might or mightn’t have happened to Iraqis over the past 10 years if we had stayed out, at least this counterfactual begins with 40,000 American soldiers spared from certain wounds or death.

Exit question: I asked this the last time I wrote about Saddam amid the Arab Spring but let me ask it again. How would he have reacted to Iran getting into the uranium-enrichment business? Even if he had refused to counter (or couldn’t counter because of effective sanctions and inspections), how would Iran’s nuclear edge on its archenemy in Baghdad have affected the odds of a Shiite uprising in Iraq? If the Shiites had squared off with Saddam and Saddam had gone into massacre mode, would Iran’s nuclear program still be, ahem, “peaceful” and “energy-related” or would it have already taken a military turn? One bomb would have meant a lot to the balance of Sunni and Shiite power next door.


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US may ally with regime we wanted to bomb 11 months ago to fight ISIS

USmayallywithregimewewantedto

US may ally with regime we wanted to bomb 11 months ago to fight ISIS

posted at 11:51 am on July 3, 2014 by Ed Morrissey

2013′s old and busted was Bashar al-Assad being a “reformer,” and the new hotness that August was that Assad was a monster that the US needed to bomb after using WMD on his own people. Skip forward eleven months and the field may reverse itself. Josh Rogin reports for The Daily Beast that the Obama administration may ally with Assad as a way to slow down or stop ISIS. That would be a remarkable shift for a White House that has spent the last three years looking for ways to bolster the rebellion fighting the Assad regime:

There’s a battle raging inside the Obama administration about whether the United States ought to push away from its goal of toppling Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and into a de facto alliance with the Damascus regime to fight ISIS and other Sunni extremists in the region.

As President Obama slowly but surely increases the U.S. military presence on the ground in Iraq, his administration is grappling with the immediate need to stop the ISIS advance and push for a political solution in Baghdad. The 3 1/2-year grinding civil war is Syria has been put on a back burner for now. Some officials inside the administration are proposing that the drive to remove Assad from power, which Obama announced as U.S. policy in 2012, be set aside, too. The focus, these officials argue, should instead be on the region’s security and stability. Governments fighting for survival against extremists should be shored up, not undermined.

“Anyone calling for regime change in Syria is frankly blind to the past decade; and the collapse of eastern Syria, and growth of Jihadistan, leading to 30 to 50 suicide attacks a month in Iraq,” one senior Obama administration official who works on Iraq policy told The Daily Beast.

If nothing else demonstrates the checkers mentality of American foreign policy over the last few years, this does. Barack Obama bombed the Moammar Qaddafi regime out of existence on the basis of “responsibility to protect,” creating a failed state in which al-Qaeda and other jihadist networks could flourish. Even while Assad was actively targeting his own people in the way the Obama administration claimed Qaddafi planned, the White House and especially Hillary Clinton insisted that Assad was a “reformer” with whom the US could work to democratize Syria.

When that clearly wasn’t working, the Obama administration switched to a reluctant opponent of Assad’s, boosting the rebels by non-lethal means publicly, and covertly sending small arms — even though we had difficulty in determining who were the “moderates” and who were the extremists. That reached a fever pitch last summer when Assad crossed the ill-advised “red line” drawn by Obama on the use of chemical weapons, at which point Obama at first moved without Congressional involvement to conduct military action against Assad’s regime. When public reaction quickly turned negative on that idea, Obama requested approval from Congress and didn’t get it.

Eleven months later, Obama now wants to work with Assad to defeat the rebellion … or at least the part of the rebellion that the US doesn’t like. The conceptual view of this partnership is a fairy tale that must be read to be believed:

Some administration officials are also suggesting that Iran could be a partner in a post-war Syria, helping to ensure security there during a transition period, after which Assad would negotiate his own departure.

Er, what? Neither Iran nor Assad want Assad to depart at all. Only someone with a rich fantasy life would believe that aligning with Iran and Assad would hasten Assad’s departure, let alone incentivize Assad to arrange for it. All that does is strengthen Assad, and Iran for that matter. It also will infuriate our Sunni partners in the region, who are aligning against Assad and especially Iran. If anything, it will accelerate the sectarian nature of the fight rather than isolate ISIS in the field.

This is what comes from having no foreign policy strategy, other than to get out of Iraq. Obama does not want to return there even to fight ISIS, which is an offshoot of al-Qaeda, even where we have a straight-up fight militarily — and there are good reasons for that, because we probably can’t arrive in time with enough forces to do the job, thanks to the total withdrawal of 2011. He won’t commit air power to it without forcing the Iraqis to dump Maliki either, which again is not altogether unjustified. However, it leaves us with no strategic or tactical way to stop ISIS, no strategic partner in Baghdad, and no other strategic partners from NATO willing to step in and help. Assad is nothing more than a life preserver tossed into an ocean of bad circumstances, and the rationalizations already arising make it look like an even more ridiculous choice.

If we want to fight ISIS, we’d be better off fighting ISIS ourselves. Propping up Assad through Iran is a complete reversal of American foreign policy of the last 35 years, in service to nothing except desperation.


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Monday, June 23, 2014

Change: Obama sending Special Ops troops back to Iraq — without legal immunity

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Change: Obama sending Special Ops troops back to Iraq — without legal immunity

posted at 5:21 pm on June 23, 2014 by Allahpundit

Legal immunity for American troops was supposedly the sticking point that led to U.S. withdrawal in 2011, of course, which means we’re now headed back in under conditions that would have kept a U.S. residual force in place all along. Obama told Maliki in 2011 that he couldn’t leave soldiers there without a guarantee that they wouldn’t be prosecuted in Iraqi courts. No way, said Maliki. The occupation’s too unpopular; parliament will never go for immunity. Oh well, said O, who was eager to bring everyone back anyway so that he’d have a little extra something to run on in 2012. And now here we are, headed back in — on Malki’s 2011 terms, without immunity.

Maybe it’s destiny for America’s Iraq adventure to end with U.S. troops tried in a kangaroo court by Shiite fanatics, after we went back in to help them.

Yet this time around, Obama is willing to accept an agreement from Iraq’s foreign ministry on U.S. forces in Iraq without a vote of Iraq’s parliament. “We believe we need a separate set of assurances from the Iraqis,” one senior U.S. defense official told The Daily Beast. This official said this would likely be an agreement or exchange of diplomatic notes from the Iraq’s foreign ministry. “We basically need a piece of paper from them,” another U.S. official involved in the negotiations told The Daily Beast. The official didn’t explain why the parliamentary vote, so crucial three years ago, was no longer needed.

Of course, part of the problem in 2014 is that the United States doesn’t have the time to wait for Iraq’s parliament. To start, the Iraqi parliament is in the process of forming a new government. The parliament would have to choose a new prime minister, parliamentary speaker and president before reopening the politically sensitive issue of approving legal protections for the military that occupied the country between 2003 and 2011…

Speaking to reporters on Friday, Pentagon spokesman, Rear Adm. John Kirby, said, “We are pursuing something in writing. The secretary is absolutely committed to making sure that our troops have the legal protections. He would not do that on a nod and a wink.”

In other words, it’s not so much that Special Ops won’t have immunity as that both sides are now ignoring Iraq’s joke of a parliament and handling things through executive agreement. So much for Iraqi democracy. The White House’s thinking, I guess, is that there’s no need to worry about American troops being tried in Iraqi courts anymore since there’s really no Iraq anymore. The Shiites will have their hands full with Sunni maniacs for years to come; if they put a single U.S. soldier on trial, they’re forfeiting America’s help forever in that war and they know it. Not even a strong interventionist like Rubio in the White House would dare put more servicemen in harm’s way if one of them ends up having to endure a show trial now. Iraq could afford to play hardball on immunity in 2011 when its biggest problem was public upset at the thought of an ongoing occupation. Now their biggest problem is ethnic cleansing. Immunity’s not so important these days.

Also, how likely is it that any of the 300 Special Ops soldiers headed over will end up in a situation where the Shiite government might want to try them? There are three reasons why they’re there. One is to gather intelligence on ISIS positions in case O decides he wants to start bombing. Two is to signal nominal U.S. support for the Iraqi state we helped build and to remind Iran that we’re still capable of projecting force just in case they get too ambitious about pushing the Sunnis back. And three, it seems, is to “advise” the Iraqi military, although after reading the stories in the NYT and WaPo this morning, it seems like there’s not much of a military left to advise.

After tens of thousands of desertions, the Iraqi military is reeling from what one U.S. official described as “psychological collapse” in the face of the offensive from militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)…

“Over time, what’s occurred is that the Iraqi army has no ability to defend itself,” said Rick Brennan, a Rand Corp. analyst and former adviser to U.S. forces in Iraq. “If we’re unable to find ways to make a meaningful difference to the Iraqi army as they fight this, I think what we’re looking at is the beginning of the disintegration of the state of Iraq.”…

“The basic problem with the Iraqi military is that it’s a sectarian force,” said James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Iraq. “That’s combined with the fact that you have sycophantic generals, you have low morale and a Shiite volunteer force. They didn’t do very much training. They don’t have the equipment or skills of the [ISIS] guys.”

Experts told the NYT that the Iraqi army is a “defeated force,” with one estimate claiming that fully a quarter of all battalions have deserted and more than a third of the army’s divisions are “combat ineffective.” Other experts tell Fox News that Iraq has a “limited number” of helicopters and just two planes that can fire Hellfire missiles from the air. That’s why Sistani, Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, sent down the word for Shiites to start volunteering to defend Baghdad. It’s not purely a matter of sectarian zeal; it’s a matter of the army no longer being equal to the task. And according to another story in today’s NYT, all of this caught the White House very much by surprise: “By the time Mosul, Tikrit and Tal Afar fell this month, it was too late. Like Mr. Bush before him, Mr. Obama misjudged the American-trained Iraqi forces, which melted away in the face of the ISIS advance. The White House was stunned…” (Says Tom Maguire, “They make nice bookends – Bush entered Iraq on the basis of faulty intelligence and Obama exited on the basis of faulty intelligence.”) Eight years of American blood, treasure, and military training went up in smoke in less than three years of Iraq on its own. Is that an argument for why Obama should have pushed harder to keep some U.S. troops in place in 2011? Or an argument for why he should have pulled out even sooner?


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Sunday, June 22, 2014

Quotes of the day

Quotesoftheday postedat8:31

Quotes of the day

posted at 8:31 pm on June 21, 2014 by Allahpundit

Amid growing signs of instability in Iraq, President Barack Obama authorized a secret plan late last year to aid Iraqi troops in their fight against Sunni extremists by sharing intelligence on the militants’ desert encampments, but devoted only a handful of U.S. specialists to the task…

Instead of providing Iraqis with real-time drone feeds and intercepted communications from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, the militant group that has overrun parts of Iraq, U.S. intelligence specialists typically gave their Iraqi counterparts limited photographic images, reflecting U.S. concerns that more sensitive data would end up in Iranian hands, these officials said…

Administration and congressional officials say the U.S. also miscalculated the readiness of Iraqi forces: The White House’s limited investment in the intelligence center was driven at least in part by the assumption that Iraqi forces would be more competent, the official said. Then, at the end of April, the Pentagon dispatched a team of special-operations personnel to assess the capabilities of Iraq’s security forces, a defense official said.

The assessment they brought back was bleak: Sunni Army officers had been forced out, overall leadership had declined, the Iraqi military wasn’t maintaining its equipment and had stopped conducting rigorous training. The response in Washington, summed up by a senior U.S. official, was: “Whoa, what the hell happened here?”

***

A new ISIS propaganda video that drew attention Friday for featuring English-speaking jihadists is a carefully crafted message meant to demonstrate the group’s popularity and strength, experts tell NBC News.

In the video, at least five fighters sit in a wooded area, with the black flag of ISIS planted in the ground behind them. Three of the fighters speak to the camera, all of them speaking English.

“We have brothers from Bangladesh, from Iraq, from Cambodia, Australia, UK,” says one fighter, who is identified as British.

“All my brothers, come to jihad,” says another fighter, who is also identified as British. “Feel the honor we are feeling, feel the happiness that we are feeling.”

***

Its extortion rackets in Mosul netted as much as $8 million a month, according to Gen. Mahdi Gharawi, until recently the Nineveh Province police commander, in an interview with Niqash, an Arabic-language news website. And that was even the ISIS insurgents took over. Once in charge, they typically levy “taxes,” which are just as lucrative. So-called road taxes of $200 on trucks are collected all over northern Iraq to allow them safe passage. The Iraqi government claims that the insurgents are now levying a “tax” on Christians in Mosul, who were a significant minority there, to avoid being crucified…

A member of the board of governors of the Central Bank of Iraq was reluctant to specify how much ISIS got away with in Mosul, but estimated that it at least $85 million and possibly much more

“ISIS gets some money from outside donors, but that pales in comparison to their self-funding,” said an American counterterrorism official. “The overwhelming majority of its money comes from criminal activities like extortion, kidnapping, robberies and smuggling. In Mosul, ISIS has probably been hauling in several million dollars monthly just from its extortion racket. In overrunning the town the group is better off financially, but probably to the tune of millions — not hundreds of millions — of dollars.”…

The militant group has so much cash that it has reopened some of the banks it looted in Falluja, in Anbar Province, to stash it in.

***

As Iraq spirals into chaos, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is now relying on the militias, which once carried out hundreds of attacks on U.S. soldiers, to help him cling to power

“Potentially what this could amount to is the U.S. arming or advising Iranian proxies, some of which are on the terror list,” said Phillip Smyth, a researcher at the University of Maryland specializing in Shiite Islamist groups…

While most disbanded, some groups, such as the Iran-backed Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kitaeb Hezbollah, which is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, have remained active since the U.S. withdrawal and have slowly built their presence in the security forces for years. Smyth described their infiltration as “systemic,” raising the possibility that U.S. advisers might soon be working alongside militiamen who once fought them…

While Sadr’s followers are in the process of organizing, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which killed and kidnapped numerous American soldiers before the U.S. withdrawal, says it is already actively working within the security forces. The ISIS advance has only strengthened that role, members said.

***

In the months before the fall of Mosul, scores of Sunnis turned up dead in Baghdad, victims of mass executions. Hundreds of families moved out of their homes in Diyala province due to intimidation. The government has been complicit: Iran-backed militias are now reporting to a special division of Maliki’s office, and in some cases, they are conducting joint operations with government forces. The abuses have apparently escalated recently. For example, on Tuesday in Baquba, the capital of Diyala, 44 Sunni prisoners were found dead in a government-controlled prison with bullet holes in their heads.

Quds Force leaders might not be ordering these atrocities directly, but they do appear to take a “boys will be boys” attitude toward horrific violence. As long as they do, it’s difficult to imagine that any Sunni leader will be eager to collaborate with a government that also partners with sectarian killers…

There’s no guarantee the U.S. can wield enough leverage to affect Iran’s behavior, or that Iran exerts enough control over the militias to calm the sectarian frenzy. For this reason, Obama appears disinclined to order air strikes unless the conditions exist for political progress. The nightmare scenario is that the U.S. could find itself bombing Sunni-majority cities while Shia militias run rampant through Baghdad. The war would become increasingly sectarian, with America taking sides. Any military victory would be fleeting. ISIS would no longer need to produce propaganda videos, because the atrocities reported on CNN would be enough to radicalize the next generation of jihadis.

***

If the oil we need is truly endangered, and this tips us into a new recession . . .

If daily we see shootings and beheadings of people who bravely and kindly stood with us during the war . . .

All that will have a grinding, embittering effect on the public mood. And if some mad group of jihadists, when their bloody work in Iraq is finished, decide to bring their efforts once again to an American city—well then, obviously, all bets will be off.

But the old American emotionalism, the assumption that the people of Iraq want what we want, freedom and democracy, is over. Ten years ago if you announced you had reservations about what the people of Iraq really want, and maybe it isn’t freedom and democracy first, such reservations were called ethnocentric, belittling, bigoted. That’s over, too. We are hard-eyed now.

***

I’ve warmed to the argument that the Sykes-Picot arrangement was, in one sense, inadvertently progressive. The makers of the modern Middle East roped together peoples of different ethnicities and faiths (or streams of the same faith) in what were meant to be modern, multicultural, and multi-confessional states. It is an understatement to say that the Middle East isn’t the sort of place where this kind of experiment has been shown to work. (I’m thinking of you, one-staters, by the way.) I don’t think it is worth American money, or certainly American lives, to keep Iraq a unitary state. It is, of course, important to invest in plans that forestall the creation of permanent jihadist safe havens, and about this the U.S. should be vigilant, more vigilant than it has been. But Westphalian obsessiveness—Iraq must stay together because it must stay together—just doesn’t seem wise.

More on all this later, but I’ll leave you with one quote from the story that struck me on re-reading, in part because it may represent what President Obama secretly feels about the Middle East. At one point, I asked David Fromkin, the author of A Peace to End all Peace, the definitive account of the making of the modern Middle East, whether he would speculate about the region’s future. This is what he said in 2007: “The Middle East has no future.”

***

It is not that there was a complete absence of authentic moderate Muslim and non-Muslim democrats in Syria. There simply aren’t enough of them to make a difference. The brute fact is that only Islamic supremacists and their ruthless jihadist factions had a chance to overthrow Assad, if they got enough outside help.

The claim that Obama abandoned the opposition is equally bogus. Because of the president’s delusional theory that the Muslim Brotherhood are “moderates” we can ally with, he quietly colluded with Qatar and the Saudis to arm and train the Syrian “rebels.” It blew up on him because the “moderates” are not moderate. The Brothers concur in al-Qaeda’s sharia goals and readily resort to terrorism if that is what is necessary to achieve them. So arming the rebels, as Obama helped do, necessarily meant arming anti-American jihadists. This has proved embarrassing, so what Obama has done, at least so far, is refrain from giving the “rebels” decisive aid — the kind he gave the “rebels” in Libya, to disastrous effect in Benghazi. That is hardly an aid vacuum.

Similarly fatuous is the vacuum narrative regarding Iraq. As I argued throughout the Bush years, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has always been Iran’s guy, and under his regime, Iran’s tentacles were allowed to spread throughout post-Saddam Iraq — the State Department and the Iraq Study Group sharing the loopy conceit that Iran had an interest in a stable Iraq even as Iran was fueling both sides of Iraq’s civil war, supplying Sunni terrorists with IEDs, and running Shiite terror cells against our troops…

In truth, Iraq was never stable. Only the presence of American troops prevented an outbreak of Sunni–Shiite warfare. The Sunnis were temporarily “awakened” by being paid off, not by a commitment to Iraqi “democracy” that promised domination by Iran-controlled Shiites. And because the conflict is global, it was never possible to obliterate al-Qaeda in Iraq.

***

Democracy became the shovel we Westerners used to dig ourselves out of destitution only after we had spent decades using it to batter one another over the head. It took generations before the Robespierres and Cromwells were worked out of the system.

Second, we are applying an emaciated version of the word “democracy.” It is a cliché to say that democracy means more than elections, but the need to build institutions and freedoms, to challenge traditional structures and end the myth that popular sovereignty is a Western import – these challenges are too often neglected…

I’m not as willing as Mr. Lilla to believe that we should merely accept this. Nor do I think we should believe the idea, popular once again in some quarters, that some societies and peoples simply aren’t meant for liberal democracy. But we do need a lot more humility, and a lot more patience.

***


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